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ABSTRACT
This  paper  is  primarily  aimed  at  highlighting  the  role  and  significance  of  asymmetric 
information  in  contributing  to  financial  contagion.  Furthermore,  in  emphasising  the 
importance of greater disclosure requirements and the need for the disclosure of information 
relating to “close links”, such disclosure being considered vital in assisting the regulator in 
identifying potential sources of material risks, it illustrates the fact that incentives (such as the 
reduction in the levels of capital to be retained by institutions), which have the potential to 
facilitate  market based regulation  (through non  binding  regulations),  may not  necessarily 
serve  as  suitable  means in  the  realisation of some  of Basel II’s objectives – namely the 
achievement  of  “prudentially  sound,  incentive-compatible  and  risk  sensitive  capital 
requirements”. 
The paper also attempts to raise the awareness that the operation of  risk mitigants does not 
justify a reduction in the capital levels to be retained by banks – since banks operating with 
risk mitigants could still be considered inefficient operators of their management information 
systems (MIS), internal control systems, and risk management processes. The fact that banks 
possess risk mitigants does not necessarily imply that they are complying with Basel Core 
Principles for effective supervision (particularly Core Principles 7 and 17) – as the paper will 
seek to demonstrate. Core Principle 7 not only stipulates that “banks and banking groups 
satisfy supervisory requirements of a comprehensive management process, ensure that this 
identifies, evaluates, monitors and controls or mitigates all material risks and assesses their 
overall capital adequacy in relation to their risk profile, but that such processes correspond to 
the  size  and complexity of  the  institution.” Certain  incentives which  assume the form  of 
capital reductions are considered by the Basel Committee to “impose minimum operational 
standards in recognition that poor management of operational risks (including legal risks) 
could render such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that although partial 
mitigation is rewarded, banks will be required to hold capital against residual risks”.
Information disclosure should be encouraged for several reasons, amongst which include the 
fact that imperfect information is considered to be a cause of market failure – which “reduces 
the  maximisation  potential  of  regulatory  competition”,  and  also  because  disclosure 
requirements  would  contribute  to  the  reduction of  risks  which  could  be  generated  when 
granting reduced capital level rewards to banks who may have poor management systems.





One of the objectives which the Basel II framework was intended to achieve is the “alignment 
of capital adequacy assessment more closely with the key elements of banking risks and to 
provide  incentives  for  banks  to  enhance  their  risk  management  and  management 
capabilities.”
2 The  Basel  Committee  is  of  the  opinion  that  “improved  risk  sensitivity  in 
minimum capital requirements” with respect to greater recognition of credit risk mitigation 
techniques,  has  the  potential  to  provide  positive  incentives  to  banks  to  improve  risk 
measurement and management of risk mitigants.
3
The  role  played  by  bank  capital  within  the  context  of  bank  soundness  and  risk  taking 
incentives and corporate governance  are factors which  are considered  to contribute  to its 
importance.
4 However, as revealed during the recent crisis, capital adequacy requirements on 
their own, cannot sufficiently address the problems generated as a result of the occurrence of 
systemic, liquidity risks and maturity mismatches. For this reason, an investigation into the 
possible impact of disclosure requirements on risk taking incentives and the effectiveness of 
such disclosure requirements would have important implications for the banking industry in 
particular. The impact of capital and disclosure requirements on risk taking incentives and 
risks will be approached from two dimensions:
1) Impact on management incentives
2) Impact on asymmetric information – given the fact that asymmetric information has 
the potential to trigger bank runs and systemic risks.
Hence  section  2  will  consider  the  impact  of  capital  and  disclosure  requirements  on 
management incentives. The impact of capital and disclosure requirements on asymmetric 
information will thereafter be considered in the first subsection to section 3 whilst the other 
subsection will comprise of a discussion on pro cyclicality – embracing a consideration of 
systemic related aspects and liquidity risks. The justification for regulation within the bank 
sector and the securities markets will be introduced under section 4. Under this section,  three 
principal  and  traditional  arguments  which  are  considered  insufficient  in  justifying  capital 
regulation within the bank sector will be analysed. A further argument which relates to the 
potential  of  information  asymmetry  between  bank  managers  and  depositors  to  generate 
market failures, and which consequently provides the rationale for government or central bank 
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though such an argument also does not evade criticism entirely.
Sections  5  and  6  will  deal  respectively  with  disclosure  requirements  and  the  impact  of 
remuneration policies on risk taking incentives. Section 7 will then introduce the concept, 
benefits and disadvantages of regulatory competition from a perspective which incorporates 
binding  and  non  binding  legislations.  As  well  as  elaborating  on  the  advantages  and 
disadvantages that are associated with binding and mandatory regulations, this section inter 
alia will attempt to draw a parallel between regulatory competition and Basel II. Focus will be 
dedicated to the effects of  capital requirements – irrespective of whether they are binding or 
non binding in nature.
Efforts  being  undertaken  to  facilitate  the  imposition  of  binding  obligations  on  credit 
institutions  and  investment  firms,  and  reasons  attributed  to  the  importance  of  binding 
recommendations, will be considered before a conclusion is arrived at.
2. Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Management Incentives
By impacting management incentives (through disclosure requirements), the effectiveness of 
capital adequacy requirements will be enhanced. It has been argued that amendments to Basel 
II will have little impact unless management incentives can be projected in the right direction.
According to Perotti and Suarez who put forward a proposal
5, “liquidity assistance to help 
banks cope with aggregate liquidity shocks is a good thing in principle, but has little value if 
banks are not given the right incentives to reduce the probability of such shocks in the first 
place”.
6
Such  a  proposal  is  aimed  at  providing  banks  with  “the  right  incentives  ex  ante  and  at 
improving the resilience of the financial system to shocks ex post”.
7 A mandatory liquidity 
insurance arrangement under which individual banks are obliged to pay a liquidity charge to 
the supervisory authority, will serve to supplement Basel II rules is also proposed.
8
Certain schemes, whilst implemented with the aim of mitigating systemic and institutional 
risks,  have  also  been  known  to  contribute  towards  higher  risk  taking  levels  and  the 
aggravation of risk levels. Two of such schemes will be considered in this paper. The first, 
namely, deposit insurance schemes will be considered in the following section whilst liquidity 
insurance arrangements will be considered under section seven of this paper.
Deposit Insurance Schemes 
Deposit  insurance  schemes,  whilst  serving  as  a  means  of  avoiding  bank  runs,  have  also 
contributed to higher risk taking levels by banks. It is argued that “deposit insurance (when 
not fairly priced), provides banks with an incentive to increase risk taking” – and that such 
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their  leverage.
9 Such  risk  taking  incentive,  it  is further  argued,  along  with  the  “potential 
externalities resulting from bank failures”, serves as one of the primary justifications for the 
regulation of bank capital.
10 Within such a context, greater disclosure requirements within the 
banking sector would generate immense benefits since it is contended that “ the presence of 
information asymmetry might make the computation of reasonable premiums impossible or 
undesirable”  – such  reasonably  priced  premiums  constituting  a  vital  step  towards  the 
“elimination of risk shifting incentives.”
11 Although the elimination of risk shifting incentives 
is  a  debatable  aim
12,  reasonably  priced  premiums  would  certainly  contribute  towards  the 
mitigation of risk shifting incentives.
3. Impact of Capital and Disclosure Requirements on Asymmetric Information.
A.The Link between Systemic Risks and Asymmetric Information
The rationale for regulation constitutes the embodiment of two issues:
- Systemic risk
- Asymmetric information
Systemic risks are considered to be of greater relevance to the banking industry. This will be 
demonstrated  through  the  relationship  between  systemic,  liquidity  risks  and  maturity 
mismatches,  and  the  role  assumed  by  central  banks  and  banks  in  liquidity  and  maturity 
transformation processes. Since  systemic risks are considered to be of greater relevance to the 
banking industry and since information asymmetry appears to be of greater relevance to the 
securities markets, it could be argued that the impact of capital regulation requirements on 
risk taking would be greater within the banking sector whilst disclosure requirements would 
impact  risk  taking  to  a  greater  extent  in  the  securities  markets  (than  within  the  banking 
sector). The expected impact of disclosure requirements and capital regulatory requirements 
on risk taking would be to mitigate incentives to take unduly high levels of risks, and not to 
eliminate risks completely.
However, there is growing justification for greater measures aimed at extending capital rules 
to  the  securities  markets.  This  not  only  arises  from  increased  conglomeration  and 
globalisation – which increases risks attributed to systemic contagion, but also the fact that 
„the globalisation of financial markets has made it possible for investors and capital seeking 
companies to switch to lightly regulated or completely unregulated markets.“
13 Furthermore, 
it is not only argued that „the fact that many banks in a number of countries have chosen to 
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Systemic risks and the central role assumed by banks in relation to liquidity serves as greater 
justification  for  regulation  with  respect  to  banks.  “The  fundamental  role  of  banks  in  the 
maturity  transformation  of  short-term  deposits  into  long-term  loans  makes  banks  inherently 
vulnerable to liquidity risk, both of an institution-specific nature and that which affects markets as 
a whole.“
15
In relation to the securities markets, information asymmetry appears to constitute a greater 
basis for regulation.
16 However, the existence of information asymmetry within the banking 
sector has the potential to generate systemic effects within the banking sector – consequences 
whose effects, it could be said, could have greater repercussions than if such were to originate 
from within the securities markets.
As illustrated in the previous section, systemic risks and asymmetric information are two 
concepts which do not operate in isolation. The importance and magnitude attached to the 
consequences of information asymmetry within the banking sector does not depend so much 
on  information  asymmetry  on  its  own,  but  its  link  with  systemic  risks,  the  relationship 
between systemic, liquidity risks and maturity mismatches, and the role assumed by central 
banks  and  banks  in  liquidity  and  maturity  transformation  processes.  The  domino  effect 
resulting from a combination of these contributes to its importance within the banking sector.
The link between liquidity and systemic risks as illustrated in the ECB’s Financial Stability 
Review, is attributed to the “destruction of specific knowledge
17 which banks have about their 
borrowers and the reduction of the common pool of liquidity.”
18 The importance of the link 
between liquidity risks and systemic risks within the banking sector is highlighted by the 
consequences  attributed  to  the  reluctance of  banks  to  retain  liquidity  - given  the  cost  of 
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19 The consequential shortfalls of liquidity as reflected by on and off balance 
sheet maturity mismatches accentuates the importance of the role assumed by central banks in 
the funding of bank balance sheets.
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B. Procyclicality – Systemic Aspects and Liquidity Risks
The three aspects to pro cyclicality
21 – as highlighted in the Impact Assessment Document 
amending the Capital Requirements Directive, have the potential to trigger a chain reaction. 
Starting with remuneration schemes, the impact of these on management incentives, could 
have a positive or negative effect on bank regulations (such as Basel II or the CRD). Such 
regulations  could  then  mitigate  or  exacerbate  pro  cyclical  effects  – depending  on  the 
effectiveness  of capital  adequacy  rules.  A positive  effect  of  such  rules  would  reduce  the 
tendency of banks to cut back on lending during economic “busts” whilst incentives to retain 
liquidity would be increased – hence reducing the likelihood of the occurrence of maturity 
mismatches.
Liquidity is considered to be “highly procyclical, growing in good times and drying up in 
times  of  stress.”
22 During  the  build  up  to  the  present  crisis,  banks  and  other  financial 
institutions had an incentive to minimise the cost of holding liquidity.
23 Given the fact that 
liquidity  could  also  be  pro  cyclical  and  given  its  role  in  the  recent  crisis,  perhaps  four 
dimensions  to  pro  cyclicality  should  have  been  introduced  in  the  Impact  Assessment 
Document
24 amending  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive  – incorporating  liquidity  as  a 
fourth heading. 
According to the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), an earlier recognition of loan losses, which 
could have been facilitated by relevant disclosures about loan loss provisioning, could have 
reduced pro cyclical effects which occurred during the recent crisis.
25 Not only does the FSF 
propose that amendments be made to the Basel II framework - amendments which are aimed 
at reducing banks’ disincentives to increase their level of provisions for loan losses, it is also 
of the opinion that measures aimed at improving market discipline could also help in reducing 
procyclicality and diversity.
26 Furthermore, incentives which would encourage banks to retain 
liquidity could be introduced – however , such incentives should be granted whilst striving to 
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regulatory framework which is more aligned  with economic and regulatory capital.
As well as drawing attention to the fact that capital buffers may not actually mitigate the 
cyclical effects of bank regulation,
27 regulators are also advised to give due consideration to 
the effects of risk weights on bank portfolio behaviour when implementing regulations.
4. Justification for Regulation within the Banking Sector and Securities Markets.
The “conventional justification” for regulation within the securities market is attributed to the 
fact that “exchanges on securities markets lead to external effects (for non participating and 
therefore  non-considered  third  parties)”.
28 Consequently  public  interest  arises  – which  is 
aimed at “protecting potentially disadvantaged parties” (owing to reasons attributed to market 
structure and information asymmetry).
29
The justification for capital adequacy regulation within the banking sector, on the basis of 
market failures, is considered to be unconvincing. According to Dowd, three principal and 
traditional arguments which he considers to be insufficiently justified include:
30
- The  argument  that  capital  adequacy  is  required  for  prudential  related  reasons.  He 
attributes the weakness in this argument to the fact that most of its proponents do not 
expand on the prudential need in the first place.
- The second argument relates to that which was put forward by Benston and Kaufman
31
which attributes the need for capital adequacy on the basis of its potential to address 
regulator- induced moral hazard problems. In Dowd’s opinion, the weakness inherent 
in this argument stems from the fact that such an argument does not provide enough 
justification for a preference for capital regulation over that of laissez faire.
- The third argument which is considered by Dowd to be more popular in Europe, is 
namely,  that  capital  adequacy  regulation  is  required for  the  protection  of  small 
depositors.  His  criticism  of  such  an  argument  relates  to  the  lack  of  clarity  and 
justification which exists in accounting for why such depositors should be accorded 
protection at the expense of taxpayers.
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forward by Miles
32, who suggested that an information asymmetry between bank managers 
and depositors had the potential to generate market failures which consequently provides the 
rationale  for  government  or  central  bank  intervention  in  the  financial  system.
33 Such  an 
argument, still, does not evade criticism which draws from Dowd’s opinion that it is not 
founded on the basis of market failure and that, rather, it is based on the government’s failure 
(moral hazard created by regulatory authorities themselves).
34
In relation  to  his criticism that failures  related to  information asymmetry are  founded  on 
governments’ failures and in relation to the inherent potential of information asymmetry to 
generate  genuine  market failures,  although  moral  hazard  resulting from  deposit  insurance 
schemes  is a consequence of  regulators’ failure to price  premiums appropriately, genuine 
market failures attributed to the chain reaction generated between systemic risks, liquidity 
risks and asymmetric information justify the need for capital adequacy regulation within the 
banking  sector.  However,  recent  crisis  has  highlighted  the  fact  that  capital  adequacy 
requirements on their own, do not suffice to counter problems attributed to systemic risks and 
liquidity risks. Furthermore, the reason for the restriction of regulation to the banking sector 
alone is not justified. 
Disclosure requirements are not only considered best in addressing information asymmetry (a 
market failure which is very peculiar, but not restricted to securities markets), but also have 
the  potential  to  exacerbate  or  prevent  (through  relevant  disclosures  about  loan  loss 
provisioning) systemic bank runs. 
5. Disclosure Requirements
Recent amendments to Pillar 3 of Basel II, which include a statement that “banks need to 
make disclosures that reflect their real risk profile as markets evolve over time”, are aimed at 
strengthening guiding principles of Pillar 3 (as provided for under paragraph 809).
35 As well 
as reflecting their real risk profiles, banks’ responsibilities towards market participants are 
also emphasised by the Basel Committee.
Paragraph 809 of the Basel II framework not only highlights the objective of Pillar 3, namely, 
the  supplementation  of  the  minimum  capital  requirements  under  Pillar  1,  as  well  as 
supplementing Pillar 2, but also draws attention to the Committee’s endeavours to promulgate 
market discipline through the development of a set of disclosure requirements which will 
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discretion in assessing capital requirements.”
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Basel II framework, reads as follows: 
“The  Committee  emphasises,  that  beyond  disclosure  requirements,  as  set  forth  in  Part  4 
Section II of the framework, banks are responsible for conveying their actual risk profile to 
market participants. Furthermore, information disclosed by banks should be adequate to meet 
this objective.”
38
Other measures aimed at enhancing disclosure requirements relate to areas which include 
“securitisation exposures in the trading book and sponsorship of off balance sheet vehicles.”
39
According to the Summary of the Impact Assessment Document, such amendments are not 
only aimed at improving investors’ understanding of risk profiles of banks, but also aimed at 
reinforcing bank risk management incentives – by allowing market participants to exercise 
discipline.
40
6. Impact of Remuneration Policies on Risk Taking Incentives
In  acknowledging  the  impact  of  remuneration  policies  on  risk  taking  incentives  in  the 
financial  sector,  paragraph  5  of  the  introductory  section  to  the  Recommendation  on 
Remuneration Policies,
41 highlights the fact that “creating appropriate incentives within the 
remuneration system itself should reduce the burden on risk management and increase the 
likelihood  that  such  systems  become  effective.”  Relevant  information  on  remuneration 
policies and any updates where a change in policy occurs constitute vital elements which 
should be disclosed – as provided for under section 3 paragraph 7 of the Recommendation. 
Furthermore, paragraph 7 of the third section highlights the importance of disclosing such 
information (which may assume the form of an independent remuneration policy statement, a 
periodic disclosure in annual financial statements), in a “clear and easily understandable way” 
to applicable stakeholders.
42
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components is based; andParagraph 2 of the Commission Recommendation on Remuneration Policies in the Financial 
Sector
43 acknowledges  that  whilst  “inappropriate  remuneration  practices”  in  the  financial 
services industry was not the principal cause of the recent financial crisis, that it is widely 
agreed that it fuelled excessive levels of risk taking – hence contributing to huge losses for 
major financial undertakings. Furthermore, the failure of financial undertakings and systemic 
problems which arose throughout the EU and worldwide, are attributed to “excessive risk 
taking” in the financial services industry.
44
According to the Summary of the Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive,
45
proposed amendments to the CRD will ultimately result in “more effective risk management 
incentives  and  practices,  more  adequate  and  less  volatile  bank  capital  requirements  and 
enhanced disclosure of bank risk positions to market participants.”
46
7. Regulatory Competition, Binding and Non Binding Legislation
The impact of binding and mandatory capital and disclosure requirements will be considered 
from the context of regulatory competition and Basel regulations.
A.Importance of Binding Legislation
In considering the role of the regulatory capital regime, it is argued
47 that even if capital 
requirements are  not binding,  they do affect  the transmission  process of  monetary policy 
(transmission  process  of  exogenous  shocks  to  bank  interest  rates,  prices,  and  economic 
activity).  The  “sizeable  real  effects”  of  binding  capital  requirements,  regardless  of  the 
regulatory regime, has constituted the focus of discussion – such sizeable real effects being 
demonstrated through the possible lending restrictions (via interest rate hikes), which banks 
may be compelled to implement  as a means of complying with such requirements. 
48  The 
different effects generated by different types of bank capital regulations in the transmission 
process of exogenous shocks to bank interest rates, prices, and economic activities has also 
been illustrated.
49 Furthermore it was demonstrated that, even if capital requirements are not 
binding, a “bank capital channel” may operate through a signalling effect of capital buffers on 
deposit rates”.
50
                                                                                                                                                     
- The main parameters and rationale for any annual bonus scheme and any other non cash 
benefits
43 < http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/docs/directors-remun/financialsector_290409_en.pdf>
44 In particular, in banks and investment firms. See paragraph 1 of the Commission Recommendation
45 Impact Assessment document amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading book, 
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51, which are aimed at complementing the existing 
regulatory framework with capital insurance or liquidity insurance mechanisms, comprise of 
the establishment of a private insurance scheme funded by investors whereby banks subject to 
capital regulation would be given the option to purchase this insurance. A decision to opt for 
such an insurance scheme; in their opinion, should be rewarded by lowering a bank’s capital 
ratio.
52
In terms of increasing flexibility (with meta regulation being accorded greatest flexibility), 
enforced self regulation
53 lies between mandatory regulation and meta regulation (an example 
being provided by Basel II). Banks subject to capital rules, but which still have the option of 
choosing certain schemes could be classified under enforced self regulation or meta regulation 
depending on whether such rules are imposed by the State or by such standard setters such as 
the  Basel  Committee.  Whether  (or  not)  management’s  incentives  could  best  be  impacted 
through  binding  legislation,  enforced  self  regulation  or  meta  regulation,  depends  on  the 
degree of fettered and unfettered discretion which should be accorded to firms – which should 
be determined based on individual firm circumstances. In relation to the previous paragraph, 
rewarding banks which have decided to opt for an insurance scheme (through a reduction of 
the bank’s capital ratio), serves as a commendable way of stimulating such banks’ incentives, 
facilitating market based regulation – whilst attempting to deal with liquidity and funding 
problems. The governing regulation (whether enforced self regulation or meta regulation) 
would  depend  on  whether  the  banks  are  subjected  to  capital  rules  imposed  by  their 
jurisdictions or to those of standard setters such as the Basel Committee. Where such banks 
are governed by rules prescribed by their national authorities and given the presumption that 
enforcement mechanisms operating in such jurisdictions are reasonably effective, then such a 
decision  to  provide such banks  with  the  option  to purchase  capital  insurance or liquidity 
insurance mechanisms would certainly appear to be the right way forward.
However  where  such  banks  are  subject  to  capital  regulation  under  (Basel  II)  the  Basel 
Committee, whose enforcement mechanisms are considered to be weak, then a decision to 
grant further options to such banks should require that such schemes not only be monitored at  
greater level than presently operates, but also enforced with greater degree than is presently 
the case. Where options are granted to banks which are subject to Basel II regulations, clear 
rules (as prescribed by the Basel Committee or other standard setters – where Basel II rules do 
not operate) defining the boundaries of such schemes should exist. 
In  relation  to  proposals  which  involve  options  to  purchase  capital  insurance  or  liquidity 
insurance mechanisms, a decision to reward such banks (who opt for such schemes) with
lower levels of capital should be considered on the basis of certain criteria which include 
inherent institutional risks attributed to such institutions – including risks which could arise 
from operational risks and poor management of internal controls. One of the objectives which 
                                                
51 “Is Basel II Procyclical?: A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review 2009 ECB 
Publications pages 148 and 149 A. Kashyap, J. Stein and R. Rajan, “Rethinking Capital Regulation”, Jackson 
Hole conference paper, 2008.
52   “Is Basel II Procyclical?: A Selected Review of the Literature” Financial Stability Review 2009 ECB 
Publications at page 149
53 With Enforced Self Regulation, regulation is „enforced“ in two senses. Firstly, the firm is 
required by 
the State to self-regulate. Secondly, privately written rules are publicly enforced. For more on this and 
on Enforced Self Regulation, see I Ayres and J Braithwaite Responsive Regulation: Transcending the 
Deregulation  Debate Oxford University Press (1992) at page 101the  Basel  II  framework  was  intended  to  achieve  is  the  “alignment  of  capital  adequacy 
assessment more closely with the key elements of banking risks and to provide incentives for 
banks  to  enhance  their  risk  management  and  management  capabilities.”
54 The  Basel 
Committee is of the opinion that “improved risk sensitivity in minimum capital requirements” 
with respect to greater recognition of credit risk mitigation techniques, has the potential to 
provide positive incentives to banks to improve risk measurement and management of risk 
mitigants.
55
Furthermore, it recognises the fact that “whilst new proposals provide capital reduction for 
various forms of transactions that reduce risk, they impose minimum operational standards in 
recognition that poor management of operational risks (including legal risks) could render 
such risk mitigants of effectively little or no value and that although partial mitigation is 
rewarded, banks will be required to hold capital against residual risks.”
56
Rewards  accorded  to  banks,  that  is  the  lowering  of  such  banks’  capital  ratios,  may  not 
necessarily facilitate a realisation of some of Basel II’s objectives – namely the achievement 
of “prudentially sound, incentive-compatible and risk sensitive capital requirements” – for 
which  the  Basel  Committee  made  provision for  an  evolutionary,  progressive  approach  to 
calculating  Pillar  One  capital  charges.
57 As  illustrated,  the  fact  that  certain  banks  have 
implemented or operate with risk mitigants does not necessarily serve as a reliable indicator 
or  calculative  basis  that  risks  within  such  institutions  are  being  managed  and  controlled 
effectively – neither does it justify a reduction in the level of capital levels to be retained by 
such banks. Furthermore, such options have the potential to facilitate practices associated with 
regulatory arbitrage since the alignment of regulatory and economic capital is considered to 
essential in mitigating such practices.
58
In what way could disclosure requirements contribute in helping to reduce risks of granting 
reduced capital level rewards to institutions who may have poor management systems?
Banks opting for insurance schemes should be subject to mandatory disclosure requirements 
which should reveal information helpful in determining whether or not they are eligible for 
such schemes and for reduced capital levels. Reasons for opting for such schemes – backed up 
by  banks'  current  financial  statements,  as  well  as  detailed  information  relating  to  the 
management  information  systems,  internal  controls  and  other  risk  management  processes 
which operate within such banks should be disclosed in order to assist in the identification of 
potential sources of risks. Risk management processes of banks and banking groups should 
not  only  be  proven  to be  complying  with  supervisory  requirements  of  a  “comprehensive 
management process”, and that such processes “identify, evaluate, monitor and control, or 
mitigate all material risks and assesses their overall capital adequacy in relation to the risk 
profile” of banks and banking groups, but that such risk management processes correspond to 
the size and complexity of the institutions.
59 With respect to internal controls and audits, 
supervisors should not only ensure that bank internal controls operate within the banks and 
                                                
54 See Consultative Document: Overview of the New Basel Capital Accord at page 1 < 
http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbsca02.pdf>
55 ibid at page 3
56 ibid
57 Such evolutionary approach, according to the Basel Committee, “allows banks that meet 
incremental minimum capital requirements to avail themselves of more risk-sensitive methodologies” in 
calculating regulatory capital”; ibid at page 7
58 See F Heid, „Cyclical Implications of Minimum Capital Requirements“ Deutsche Bundesbank 
Discussion Paper Series 2: Banking and Financial Studies No 06/2005 at page 2
59 Core Principle 7, Basel Core Principles for Effective System of Banking Supervisionthat these are adequate for the size and complexity of their business, but should also include 
clear  arrangements  for  delegating  authority  and  responsibility,  delineate  between  certain 
functions,
60but ensure that reconciliation of processes exist, as well as confirm that banks’ 
assets  are  safeguarded  with  appropriate  independent  internal  audit  and  compliance 
functions.
61
Section 3.4 of the Summary of the Impact Assessment Document
62 highlights the need for a 
“legally binding EU instrument” which would reinforce the role of supervisors and empower 
them in their assessment of remuneration schemes of certain regulated financial institutions 
within a broader context of sound risk management. Such an argument, “within the context of 
prudential supervision”, has been advanced, not only because of “the importance of achieving 
relevant objectives more effectively”, but also given the fact that recommendations are not 
legally enforceable instruments.
63 Furthermore, the need to discourage practices related to 
regulatory  arbitrage,  practices  which  could  occur  in  the  event  that  companies  decide  to 
relocate to jurisdictions where a recommendation
64 does not apply, and in the absence of a 
binding  EU  legislation,  constitutes  another  reason  for  introducing  a  legally  binding 
instrument.
65
B. The Theory of Regulatory Competition
Whilst some apparent advantages are associated with binding and mandatory regulations, the 
disadvantage inherent in mandatory regulation – when compared with the form of regulation 
synonymous with regulatory competition, is namely, the fact that mandatory regulation does 
not provide the choice of legal regimes which is offered to market participants under the 
theory of regulatory competition. It is contended that mandatory regulation, by compelling 
market participants to comply with a legal regime, generates “sub-optimal” benefits whilst the 
availability of choice accorded by the theory of regulatory competition, provides the potential 
to generate optimal regulation.
66
                                                
60 Functions which involve committing the bank, paying away its funds, and accounting for its 
assets and 
liabilities; See Core Principle 17, Basel Core Principles for Effective System of Banking Supervision
61 ibid
62 See Summary of Impact Assessment document amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading 
book, securitization issues and remuneration policies at page 4 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/bank/docs/regcapital/com2009/summary_en.pdf
63 ibid
64 In this case , the Commission Recommendation on remuneration policies
65 See Summary of Impact Assessment document amending Capital Requirements Directive on trading 
book, securitization issues and remuneration policies at page 4
66 „A possible problem with a mandatory disclosure regime is that all issuers must reveal the same 
information about themselves, without consideration of their individual characteristics or the needs of their target 
investors. Given that preparing a disclosure statement is costly, particularly for an initial public offering, these 
mandatory disclosure rules may price out some issuers from making offerings that are desirable to the market.“ 
See EJ Pan,  "Harmonization of U.S.-EU securities regulation: The case for a single European securities 
regulator". Law and Policy in International Business at page 3 FindArticles.com.  
http://findarticles.com/p/articles/mi_qa3791/is_200301/ai_n9192864/Other benefits attributed to the theory of regulatory competition include:
67
- By modifying their regulations to optimally match the interests of those that bear the 
cost and incur the benefit of regulation, regulators would be able to facilitate more 
superior regulation
- Regulatory  competition  permits  the  creation  of  a  single  market  without  requiring 
member states to forfeit their regulatory power.
C. Criticisms of the Theory of Regulatory Competition
The  main  criticism  which  the  theory  has  generated  relates  to  the  fact  that  “unfettered 
regulatory  competition”  would  result  in  a  “race  to  the  bottom”  whereby  regulators,  in 
competing for their interests, minimise rules to such an extent that the resulting outcome and 
benefits generated by such rules are minimal than required.
68 Furthermore, it is argued that 
“regulatory co-opetition” is preferable to regulatory competition, not only because it offers a 
model through which optimal governance could be achieved (in a world where some degree 
of market failure will certainly almost exist), but also given the fact that “optimal governance 
requires a flexible mix of competition and co operation between governmental actors, as well 
as between governmental and non governmental actors.”
69
Many similarities exist between Basel II and the form of regulation which is synonymous 
with the theory of regulatory competition. Basel II could also be considered to “optimally 
match the interests of those that bear the cost and incur the benefit of regulation”
70– given its 
flexibility, its advanced and highly collaborative approach in generating rules. Basel II also 
allows for a choice of legal regimes- even though banks are still subjected to some degree of 
mandatory legislation. 
Proposed  amendments  to  the  Capital  Requirements  Directive  (CRD),  as  stipulated  in  the 
Summary of the Document amending the Capital Requirements Directive, are intended to 
“impose a binding obligation on credit institutions and investment firms to have remuneration 
policies  which  are  consistent  with  effective  risk  management.”
71 The  expected  result  of 
making  relevant  principles  (which  are  to  be  set  out  in  the  CRD)  binding,  will  be  the 
                                                
67 ibid ;The existence of three elements, on which regulatory competition is dependent are as follows: 
diversity of legal regimes, entity mobility, and governmental responsiveness; see ibid at page 3
68 ibid at page 4
69 See D C Esty and D Geradin, “Regulatory Competition and Economic Integration: Comparative 
Perspectives” Oxford University Press 2001 at page 31; Furthermore, Esty and Geradin argue that whilst 
proponents of regulatory competition may contend that co-opetition leads to increased regulatory “capture” by 
interest groups – hence reduced governmental transparency and accountability, that “pitting environmental 
NGOs, industry associations, and other interests against each other, works out to flesh out viable policies, induce 
investment in the creation of policy analysis and other valuable information”- factors which, in their opinion, 
provide a watch dog mechanism and consequently serve as a check on regulatory capture; see ibid at page 45
70 EJ Pan,  "Harmonization of U.S.-EU securities regulation: The case for a single European securities 
regulator". Law and Policy in International Business at page 3
71 See pages 5 and 6 of the Summary of the Document amending the Capital Requirements 
Directive (section 5.4 “Supervisory Review of Remuneration Policies”)enhancement of compliance with such principles.
72 It is also emphasised that a more effective 
implementation of the relevant principles of the Recommendation on remuneration policies 
would imply a “trade off which includes long – term benefits for the industry” which are 
attributed to improved risk management results, and of greater importance, broader benefits 
which relate to a “more stable and less pro cyclical financial system.”
73
8. Conclusion
One  vital  reason  why  information  disclosure  should  be  encouraged  lies  in  the  fact  that 
imperfect  information  is  considered  to  be  a  cause  of  market  failure  which  reduces  the 
maximisation potential of regulatory competition.
74  With regulatory competition, „efforts to 
outdo each other in reducing regulatory standards can trigger a downward spiral, also known 
as a “race to the bottom”, at the end of which only minimum regulatory standards, at best, can 
be enforced, making market events increasingly opaque and risky.“
75 A consideration of the 
advantages and  disadvantages  of regulatory competition would appear to  suggest  that the 
regulatory co-optition model should be adopted. Even though such a model is considered by 
proponents of regulatory competition as having the potential to result in increased regulatory 
“capture”  by  interest  groups  – hence  resulting  in  less  governmental  transparency  and 
accountability, proponents of co-opetition argue that, amongst other benefits, it would result 
in the “fleshing out of viable policies and generate countervailing forces” which would not 
only serve as a watch dog mechanism, but also as a check on “capture”.
76
Justification for greater enforcement with Basel II (than is presently the case), arises from the 
fact that whilst state imposed rules are obligatory, Basel II rules are persuasive by nature. 
Although Basel II and the regulatory competition theory facilitate market based regulation 
and harmonisation, once a member state has opted to be bound by certain rules, then such 
rules should be enforced in their entirety. The freedom to opt – through an initial decision, 
should not imply a freedom to decide at convenience. Even though a firm is still offered 
choices under Basel II, choices which are intended to best match their needs, such choices 
should  still  be  made  in  accordance  with  guidelines  prescribed  by  the  standard  setters 
(compliance)  and  enforced  accordingly.  In  other  words,  such  choices  are  still  limited  by 
boundaries stipulated by law.
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